This book describes and explains Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore s attitudes and policies regarding the Vietnam War. While it is generally known that all three countries supported the US war effort in Vietnam, it reveals the motivations behind the decisions of the decision makers, the twists and turns and the nuances in the attitudes of Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore following the development of the war from the 1950s through to its end in 1975. Although the principal focus is the three supposedly non-aligned countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the perspectives of Thailand and the Philippines - the two Southeast Asian countries which were formally allied with the United States - are discussed at the appropriate junctures. It makes an original contribution to the gradually growing literature on the international history of the Vietnam War and furthers our knowledge of the diplomatic history of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the early independent years, 1945/1949, 1957 and 1965 respectively, which coincided with early years of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.

This book describes and explains Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore's attitudes and policies regarding the Vietnam War. While it is generally known that all three countries supported the US war effort in Vietnam, it reveals the motivations behind the decisions of the decision makers, the twists and turns and the nuances in the attitudes of Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore following the development of the war from the 1950s through to its end in 1975. Although the principal focus is the three supposedly non-aligned countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the perspectives of Thailand and the Philippines - the two Southeast Asian countries which were formally allied with the United States - are discussed at the appropriate junctures. It makes an original contribution to the gradually growing literature on the international history of the Vietnam War and furthers our knowledge of the diplomatic history of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the early independent years, 1945/1949, 1957 and 1965 respectively, which coincided with early years of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, presents a history of the war from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. It charts relations with Moscow and Beijing, showing how the involvement of the two major communist powers changed over time, and how the Vietnamese, despite their huge dependence on the Chinese and the Soviets, were most definitely in charge of their own decision making. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the many one-sided studies of the war, and presents a very interesting new perspective.

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, tells the story of the war from the Tet offensive in 1968 up to the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the predominantly US-centric narratives of the war by placing the Vietnamese communists centre-stage in the story. It is a sequel to the author's RoutledgeCurzon book The Vietnam War From the Other Side, which covers the period 1962-68.

Contents:
Introduction
1. The Start of Negotiations
Decision to negotiate
The Tet Offensive - Phase II
The start of the talks in Paris
The Tet Offensive - Phase III
Le Duc Tho-Harriman private meetings: the first five sessions
Hiccups and resumption of talks
The military situation in 1968 reviewed
The Four-Party Conference begins
The military situation in early 1969
Policy differences within the Hanoi leadership
NLF's ten-point plan and Nixon's eight-point plan
Establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRGSVN)
Stalemate in Paris
Hanoi and Sino-Soviet relations
Ho Chi Minh's death and its aftermath
Military developments in the South
Military developments in Laos
The Negotiations in 1969 reviewed
2. The Widening War
The 18th plenary session of the Lao Dong Party
Reorganising the VPA
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger first secret meeting (21 Feb 1970)
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger second secret meeting (16 Mar 1070)
Communist activities in Cambodia
The deposition of Sihanouk and its aftermath
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger third secret meeting (4 April 1970)
Indochinese Summit conference (24-25 Apr 1970)
Tensions between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists
Military developments in Cambodia
Le Duan - 'first among equals'
Xuan Thuy-Kissinger secret meeting (7 Sept 1970)
Communist military preparations
Xuan Thuy-Kissinger secret meeting (27 Sept 1970)
3. Fighting and Negotiating
Kissinger's approach rebuffed
19th plenary session of the Lao Dong Party
COSVN Directive No 01/CT71
Communist Spring-Summer 1971 counter-offensives: Route 9 - southern Laos and Cambodia
Sino-Vietnamese communist relations
Communist counter-offensive: Tay Nguyen
Vietnamese-Cambodian communist relations
Xuan Thuy-Kissinger meeting (31 May 1971)
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meeting (26 June 1971)
Hanoi's analysis of the situation in mid-1971
Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing
Vietnamese communist relations with Beijing and Moscow
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meeting (12 July 1971)
Kissinger's new eight-point plan
Vietnamese communist relations with Moscow
Kissinger's second visit to Beijing
Kissinger's new offer
Hanoi's analysis of the situation at the end of 1971
4. Negotiations at a Standstill
Secret meetings made public
Nixon's visit to China
Communist military preparations
20th plenary session of the Lao Dong Party
The 1972 Easter Offensive
US air bombing
Vietnam-Soviet relations
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meeting (2 May 1972)
US-Soviet Summit meeting
A change of strategy
5. The Peace Agreement
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meeting (19 July 1972)
Hanoi's new negotiation strategy
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meetings (1 and 14 Aug 1972)
Vietnamese communist relations with Beijing and Moscow
Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meeting (15 Sept 1972)
The 26-27 Sept 1972 intensive negotiations
Communist plan for 'General Uprising' (4 Oct 1972)
8-12 Oct 1972 Negotiations
Xuan Thuy-Kissinger meeting (17 Oct 1972)
The Peace Agreement aborted
Another cycle of negotiations
Linebacker II and counter offensives
Another attempt at negotiation
The Final Agreement
Laying the groundwork for the Agreement
6. An Incomplete Victory
Communist strategy for the South
COSVN meeting (16-17 Mar 1973)
COSVN Directive 3/CT/73
The journey to Hanoi
Meeting with Le Duan
Discussions with Central Military Committee
Developments in South Vietnam reviewed
The Politburo meeting of 1 June 1973
Developments in North Vietnam
Developments in Laos
Developments in Cambodia
Vietnamese communist relations with China and the USSR
Hanoi, Bejing and the on-going conflict in Cambodia
COSVN Conference (Sept 1973)
Military preparations
Resolution 21 (15 Oct 1973) and COSVN Resolution 12
Developments in the US
7. Ending the War
The situation in the South
Military preparations
Meeting with Le Duan at Do Son
COSVN Conference (July 1974)
Politburo meeting (Sept-Oct 1974)
Politburo meeting (Dec 1974-Jan 1975)
The fighting in the South
The 1974-5 dry season offensive
Vietnamese communist relations with Beijing and Moscow
The Ho Chi Minh Campaign

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, presents a history of the war from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. It charts relations with Moscow and Beijing, showing how the involvement of the two major communist powers changed over time, and how the Vietnamese, despite their huge dependence on the Chinese and the Soviets, were most definitely in charge of their own decision making. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the many one-sided studies of the war, and presents a very interesting new perspective.

New insight into the defense history of Singapore. Even small states can have grand strategies. Singapore, despite its poor natural resource endowment, small population, and size, has often been described as punching above its weight in international affairs. Part of this stems from the way Singapore strategically integrates the different diplomatic, political, and defense-oriented tools at its disposal. To explore this, Singapore’s Grand Strategy offers a fresh and useful diplomatic, defense, and security history of Singapore, from its independence in 1965 through today’s period of strategic realignment.  Most previous studies of grand strategy have focused on super- or at least middle powers, but this book presents an important contribution to international relations and strategic studies by showing how the concept can help explain the strategic posture and achievements of small states as well. Moreover, he brings a historian's perspective to a subject usually tackled by political scientists. The result will be useful and important for scholars in these fields.

Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years explores the security of Singapore in the last 50 years and its possible trajectories into the future. This volume brings together the diverse perspectives of a team of academics with different expertise, ranging from history to political science to security studies with a common interest in Singapore. The book is further boosted by the recollections of key civil servants involved with foreign affairs and defence, such as S R Nathan, Peter Ho, Bilahari Kausikan and Philip Yeo.

Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years explores the security of Singapore in the last 50 years and its possible trajectories into the future. This volume brings together the diverse perspectives of a team of academics with different expertise, ranging from history to political science to security studies with a common interest in Singapore. The book is further boosted by the recollections of key civil servants involved with foreign affairs and defence, such as S R Nathan, Peter Ho, Bilahari Kausikan and Philip Yeo.